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I.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of a ruling on a motion for summary judgment dismissal in a civil
action. R. 152-54. Therefore, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 2002) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
"orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals
does not have original appellate jurisdiction").
II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

The issue presented is whether the trial court erred in applying the savings

statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40, despite Plaintiffs/Appellees' failure to timely satisfy
the legislative mandates establishing compulsory conditions precedent to commencing
litigation of malpractice actions against health care providers as set forth in Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002), thereby preventing Plaintiffs/Appellees from having
commenced within due time their action prior to the running of the applicable statute of
limitations and barring Plaintiffs/Appellees' medical malpractice action. R. 43-56; 87-97.
The standard of review is one of correctness, giving no deference to the legal
conclusions of the trial court. This Court has held, "In reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, we give the court's legal decisions no deference, reviewing for correctness.
Specifically, a district court's interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law
that we review for correctness." Davis County Waste Management v. City of Bountiful,
2002 UT 60, 52 P.3d 1174 (citations omitted).
1

"In matters of pure statutory interpretation, an appellate court
reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness and gives no
deference to its legal conclusions." Moreover, when called
upon to interpret a statute, "our primary goal is to give effect to
the legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was
meant to achieve." The best evidence of the true intent and
purpose of the legislature in enacting a statute is the plain
language of the statute. "We therefore look first to the statute's
plain language."
Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Center, Inc., 2000 UT 90, \ 7, 15 P.3d 1030 (citations
omitted).
III.
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations are determinative
or important to the resolution of this appeal.
1.
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and
other courts—Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except
as limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all
extraordinary writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction
as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both
original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters
filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an
appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3 (Supp. 2002). Definitions.

(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing created in Section 58-1-103.

(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished,
2

or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical
care, treatment, or confinement.

(14) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach
of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal
injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which
should have been rendered by the health care provider.

(20) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care
provider, under a contract, express or implied.
3.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1996). Statute of limitations-ExceptionsApplication.
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be
brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs . . . .
4.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1996). Notice of intent to commence action.
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated
unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his
executor or successor, at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to
commence an action. Such notice shall include a general statement of
the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and place
of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of
misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant, the nature of the
alleged injuries and other damages sustained. Notice may be in letter
or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his attorney. Service
shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the manner
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the
summons and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return
receipt requested, in which case notice shall be deemed to have been
served on the date of mailing. Such notice shall be served within the
time allowed for commencing a malpractice action against a health
care provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior to the
expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the
malpractice action against the health care provider shall be extended
3

to 120 days from the date of service of notice. . . .
5,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002). Division to provide
panel-Exemption- Procedures-Statute of limitations tolled-Composition of
panel-Expenses-Division authorized to set license fees.
(l)(a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in alleged medical
liability cases against health care providers as defined in Section
78-14-3, except dentists.
(b)(i) The division shall establish procedures for prelitigation
consideration of medical liability claims for damages arising
out of the provision of or alleged failure to provide health care.
(ii) The division may establish rules necessary to administer
the process and procedures related to prelitigation hearings and
the conduct of prelitigation hearings in accordance with
Sections 78-14-12 through 78-14-16.
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and are not
subject to Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act, but are compulsory as a condition precedent to
commencing litigation.
(d) Proceedings conducted under authority of this section are
confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process.
(2)(a) The party initiating a medical liability action shall file a request for
prelitigation panel review with the division within 60 days after the service
a statutory notice of intent to commence action under Section 78-14-8.
(b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent to
commence action. The request shall be mailed to all health
care providers named in the notice and request.
(3)(a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this
section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of
60 days following the division's issuance of an opinion by the
prelitigation panel, or 60 days following the termination of
jurisdiction by the division as provided in this subsection. The
division shall send any opinion issued by the panel to all parties by
regular mail.
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(b)(i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under
this section within 180 days after the filing of the request for
prelitigation panel review, or within any longer period as
agreed upon in writing by all parties to the review.
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within
the time limits established in Subsection (3)(b)(i), the division
has no further jurisdiction over the matter subject to review
and the claimant is considered to have complied with all
conditions precedent required under this section prior to the
commencement of litigation.
(c)(i) The claimant and any respondent may agree by written
stipulation that no useful purpose would be served by
convening a prelitigation panel under this section.
(ii) When the stipulation is filed with the division, the division
shall within ten days after receipt enter an order divesting itself
of jurisdiction over the claim, as it concerns the stipulating
respondent, and stating that the claimant has complied with all
conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation
regarding the claim. . . .
6.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996). Effect of failure of action not on merits
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon
for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or
upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time
limited either by law or contract for commencing the same shall have
expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action survives, his
representatives, may commence a new action within one year after the
reversal or failure.
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This interlocutory appeal was brought to challenge the Ruling on Motion for
Summary Judgement issued by the district court. The Defendants/Appellants IHC Health
Services, Inc. dba Dixie Regional Medical Center (hereinafter "Dixie Regional Medical

5

Center") and G. Stedman Huard, M.D. (hereinafter "Dr. Huard") each moved to dismiss
Plaintiffs/Appellees' (hereinafter "McBride-Williams") claims for failure to comply with
the compulsory conditions precedent to commencing a malpractice claim mandated by the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (the "Act") as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1
(1996) et seq. prior to the running of the statute of limitations barring their claims. R. 4372.
Following briefing by the parties and oral argument, the trial court on August 30,
2002 entered its ruling denying Dixie Regional Medical Center's and Dr. Huard's motions.
R. 152-14. In denying their motions, the trial court concluded "that the 'savings' provisions
of section 78-12-40 are applicable to Plaintiffs' action against Defendants." R. 154. the
Dixie Regional Medical Center now appeals the trial court's legal conclusion on the ground
that because McBride-Williams did not satisfy the statutory conditions precedent to
commencing litigation, the mere filing of a complaint prior to satisfying the statutory
conditions precedent could not and did not commence their medical malpractice action
within due time. The express statutory language of the Act specifying that certain statutory
procedures are "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation"
indicates clear legislative intent to bar medical malpractice actions unless those conditions
precedent are satisfied prior to the running of the statute of limitations. Therefore,
McBride-Williams' failure to satisfy the conditions is not cured by the application of the
savings statute.

6

V.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented to this Court for review.
1.

McBride-Williams' medical malpractice action arises from the September

11, 1998 admission of their father, Kaarman McBride, to Dixie Regional Medical Center
where surgery was performed for an abdominal aortic aneurysm and where Mr. McBride
received care prior to his death on October 15, 1998. R. 13.
2.

The injury which is the subject of this action, Mr. McBride's death, occurred

and was certainly discovered by October 15, 1998. R. 44; 152.
3.

Dixie Regional Medical Center and Dr. Huard are each a "Health care

provider" as defined by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-143(1 l)(Supp. 2002). R. 44-45.
4.

Under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, a '"Malpractice action against a

health care provider' means any action against a health care provider, whether in contract,
tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries
relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the
health care provider." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14) (Supp. 2002). R. 45.
5.

The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act also sets forth various conditions

which are "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002). R. 46.
6.

McBride-Williams previously filed an initial complaint on September 15,

2000 (hereinafter "Initial Complaint"). R. 152.
7

7.

Because the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act clearly mandates that no

malpractice litigation against a health care provider may be commenced until the plaintiff
satisfies conditions which "are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing
litigation," Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c), and because McBride-Williams had not met
those statutory conditions precedent to commence litigation, Dixie Regional Medical
Center and Dr. Huard moved to dismiss the Initial Complaint filed on September 15, 2001.
R.44.
8.

On May 29, 2001, the trial court granted Dixie Regional Medical Center's

and Dr. Huard's motions to dismiss the Initial Complaint because of McBride-Williams"
"failure to comply with the pre-litigation requirements of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act, §§ 78-14-let. seq." R. 51-53; 152-53.
9.

In the May 29, 2001 order, the trial court referred to documents submitted

by McBride-Williams demonstrating that even before they had filed their initial complaint,
McBride-Williams had "been warned about the need to follow required pre-litigation
procedures." R. 52. Those documents included correspondence dated A.pril 6, 1999 from
a Utah attorney advising McBride-Williams, "I have sent along the Utah Statutes pertaining
to medical malpractice. In addition to the two-year statute of limitations, there are other
requirements. It would be best if you retained an attorney." For example, to toll the statute
of limitations for a medical malpractice action a plaintiff must file a notice of intent
pursuant to Section 78-14-8 and properly initiate the prelitigation panel review pursuant to
Section 78-14-12. Further, in correspondence dated May 19, 1999, McBride-Williams
Appellee Teresa McBride admits, "I am aware the statute is 2 years in Utah." In addition, in
8

a letter dated July 1, 1999, McBride-Williams Appellee Teresa McBride was advised, "You
should be aware that state and federal laws limit the time frame within which a legal action
may be brought in this type of case. The period of time available for filing a legal action is
determined through application of the relevant statute of limitations in your jurisdiction to
the facts of the case. If you should have any questions on the statute of limitations issue,
you should consult a legal professional without delay." The court found at that time that
"Plaintiffs' decision to attempt the interstate, pro se litigation of a complicated and
sophisticated legal matter is simply foolhardy." R. 51-53.
10.

Because the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act provides that medical

malpractice actions must be "commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury,
whichever first occurs," Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4, and because McBride-Williams had
not complied with the statutory provisions which toll the statute of limitations, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-12(3), the statute of limitations for McBride-Williams to commence their
medical malpractice action had run no later than October 15, 2000, the date two years after
the death of Kaarman McBride. R. 44.
11.

On May 9, 2001, after the statute of limitations had already run,

McBride-Williams belatedly served a Notice of Intent and Request for Prelitigation
Review with the Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing as required by Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-14-8 and 78-14-12. R. 44; 153.
12.

On December 12, 2001, a Certificate of Compliance was issued by the

Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing. R. 44; 153.
9

13.

McBride-Williams thereafter, on January 11, 2002, filed their second

complaint (hereinafter "Second Complaint"). R. 13.
14.

Dixie Regional Medical Center filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on

April 17, 2002, on the grounds that McBride-Williams' failure to timely comply with the
legislative mandates which are "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing
litigation," Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c), resulted in McBride-Williams' action being
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. R. 43-55. Dr. Huard joined in the motion on
May 1,2002. R. 59-72
15.

McBride-Williams opposed the motions to dismiss, filing various

memoranda in opposition. R. 73-75; 147-151.
16.

On June 20, 2002, oral argument was heard on the motions to dismiss. R.

17.

On August 30, 2002, the Honorable G. Rand Beacham entered a ruling

152.

denying Dixie Regional Medical Center's and Dr. Huard's motions based the court's
conclusion that the savings statute applied to the dismissal of the Initial Complaint.. R.
152-14. The trial court found that there were no genuine issues as to the following facts:
Plaintiffs seek damages related to the death of their father,
which occurred October 15, 1998 at IHC's hospital in St.
George, Utah. Plaintiffs first filed a pro se Complaint on
September 15, 2000, which was dismissed by this Court on
May 29, 2001 for Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the
prelitigation requirements of the Utah Healthcare Malpractice
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§78-14-1 et seq. See McBrideWilliams et al. v. Huard, et al.. Civil No. 00501491, Fifth
District Court for Washington County, State of Utah.
R. 152-53.
10

VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
McBride-Williams' medical malpractice action arises out of the care provided to
Mr. McBride by Dr. Huard and Dixie Regional Medical Center at the Dixie Regional
Medical Center on September 11 and 12, 1998 and prior to Mr. McBride's death on
October 15, 1998. Because this is a medical malpractice action, it is governed by the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 et seq. In 1985, the
legislature amended the Act to establish certain statutory requirements which are
"compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation" of a medical
malpractice action. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (emphasis added). The express
statutory language specifying that the statutory procedures are "compulsory as a condition
precedent to commencing litigation" clearly demonstrates the intent that these
requirements must be completed prior to commencement of a medical malpractice action
and indicates clear legislative intent to bar medical malpractice actions unless those
conditions precedent are satisfied prior to the running of the statute of limitations.
Despite having "been warned about the need to follow required pre-litigation
procedures", (R. 152,) McBride-Williams ignored such warnings and disregarded the
requirements of the Act by filing their Initial Complaint on September 15, 2000 prior to
satisfying the Act's requirements which are "compulsory as a condition precedent to
commencing litigation " Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c). On May 29, 2001,
McBride-Williams' Initial Complaint was dismissed for "failure to comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, §§ 78-14-let. seq." R.
11

152-53.
Based on established principles of statutory interpretation, McBride-Williams'
filing of their Initial Complaint could not and did not commence McBride-Williams'
medical malpractice action within due time. By specific legislative mandate the
commencing of a medical action requires more than the usual rule for commencing an
action of filing a complaint or service of a summons as specified in Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, McBride-Williams should not be allowed to knowingly
disregard the requirements and time frame established by the Act through simply filing a
complaint and resorting to the application of the savings statute. McBride-Williams'
knowing failure to satisfy the Act's requirements which are "compulsory as condition
precedent to commencing litigation," resulted in McBride-Williams failing to commence
an action "within due time" as required for application of the savings statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996). Because the compulsory conditions precedent to commencing a
medical malpractice action were not timely satisfied, no action was commenced in due
time by McBride-Williams. Therefore, McBride-Williams' failure to satisfy the statutory
conditions precedent to commencing their medical malpractice action is not cured by the
application of the savings statute.
Not only was the filing of their Initial Complaint ineffective to commence their
medical malpractice action in due time, it was also ineffective to toll the statute of
limitations because McBride-Williams had failed to comply with the statutory
requirements necessary to toll the applicable statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 7814-4; -12(3), and the statute of limitations ran on October 15, 2000 barring
12

McBride-Williams' medical malpractice claims.
VII.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT SPECIFIES THAT CERTAIN
REQUIREMENTS MUST BE SATISFIED BEFORE A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ACTION CAN BE COMMENCED.
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 et
seq., clearly provides that no malpractice litigation against a health care provider may be
commenced until the plaintiff satisfies conditions which "are compulsory as a condition
precedent to commencing litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002)
(emphasis added). The Act further specifies that a medical malpractice claimant must have
"complied with all conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation regarding
the claim" and must satisfy "all conditions precedent required under this section prior to
the commencement of litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(b)(ii), -12(3)(c)(ii)
(Supp. 2002) (emphasis added.) By the plain language of the Act, it is clear that the
prelitigation panel review processes set forth in Section 78-14-12 are operative in the
commencement of a medical malpractice action and determine when and how an action can
be commenced.1

]

The Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5 provides, in pertinent part, that "The
district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this
constitution or by statute." The Act specifically limits the jurisdiction of the district court
by setting forth conditions precedent to the commencement of a malpractice action against
a health care provider.
13

The issues before this Court are readily resolved in favor of Dixie Regional Medical
Center through the proper statutory interpretation of the applicable statutes. As the Utah
Supreme Court has held:
When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look
first to the plain language of the statute. In so doing, [w]e
presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give
effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning. We will not infer substantive terms into the text that
are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based
on the language used, and [we have] no power to rewrite the
statute to conform to an intention not expressed.
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 2001 UT 29, U 12, 24 P.3d 928 (quotation
marks and citations omitted, alterations in original). Thus, each word in the phrase
"compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation" is to be given effect.2
Thus, the terms "compulsory," "condition precedent to commencing litigation," "required,
"and "prior to the commencement" should be given effect. Therefor it is necessary to
consider what the plain meaning of "condition precedent" is. Condition precedent is

2

In fact, inclusion in the act of language specifying requirements which are
"compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation" is unique among Utah
statutes. No other Utah statutory provision specifies conditions precedent to "commencing
litigation." For example, Section 63-30-11(2) of the Governmental Immunity Act deals
only with the filing of a notice of claim, but lacks language addressing the commencing of
an action. Nowhere in the Governmental Immunity Act is there a specific legislative
mandate similar to that in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act specifying that compliance
with the prelitigation requirements is "compulsory as a condition precedent to
commencing litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis
added). Moreover, nowhere in the Governmental Immunity Act does the legislature clearly
indicate, as it does in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, that the claimant must "have
complied with all conditions precedent required under this section prior to the
commencement of litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(b)(ii) (Supp. 2002)
(emphasis added).
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defined as follows: "A condition precedent is one . . . which is to be performed before
some right dependent thereon accrues, or some act dependent thereon is performed."
Black's Law Dictionary, (6th Ed. 1991).
In addition, the statutory scheme of the Act is interpreted as a comprehensive whole.
The primary role of statutory interpretation is to give effect to
the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute
was meant to achieve. The best indicator of that intent is the
plain language of the statute. Also, [a] general rule of statutory
construction is that a statute should be construed as a
comprehensive whole.
Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Coram 'n, 916 P.2d 344, 358 (Utah 1996) quotation
marks and citations omitted, alterations in original). The statutory scheme set forth in the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act focuses on what is the proper statute of limitations
period. It is uncontested that the applicable statute of limitations governing
McBride-Williams' medical malpractice claims is set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4.
The legislature crafted the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act to include provisions ensuring
that the statute of limitations is tolled during a properly initiated prelitigation process,
which is compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002).
In section 78-14-12, the legislature made clear that panel
review is to be a precondition to the commencement of a
malpractice action: 'The proceedings are informal, nonbinding
. . . but are compulsoiy as a condition precedent to
commencing litigation." Id. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (emphasis
added). In addition, to remove any doubt that panel review is to
occur prior to any litigation, the legislature used the term
"prelitigation" to describe the panel or its activities no less
than ten times. Id. § 78-14-12(l)(b), (2)(a), (3), (5)(a), (7),
(8)(b). Finally, the legislature unambiguously provided that
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panel review would toll the applicable statute of limitations:
"The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this
section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until 60 days
following the division's issuance of an opinion by the
prelitigation panel." Id. § 78-14-12(3). Thus, a cursory
examination of this section reveals that the legislature is quite
adept at both mandating panel review of claims as a
precondition to litigation and tolling applicable statutes of
limitations.
DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 852 (Utah 1996) (Russon, J., dissenting).
The clear intent is that prior to commencing litigation of a medical malpractice
claim, the prelitigation process must be timely initiated and the statute of limitations
thereby tolled before the running of the original statute of limitations. In the medical
malpractice context, a plaintiff cannot toll or extend the statute of limitations by simply
filing a complaint in district court when the conditions precedent to commencing litigation
have not been met.
Such principles of statutory construction and interpretation are well established.
In matters of statutory construction, "[t]he best evidence of the
true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting [an] Act is
the plain language of the Act." "[Statutory enactments are to be
construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and
meaningful." Likewise, we are compelled to give the statutory
language meaning and to assume that "each term in the statute
was used advisedly . . . unless such a reading is unreasonably
confused or inoperable." We will avoid an interpretation which
renders portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or
inoperative.
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997) (citing State v. Hunt,
906 P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995); Savage Indus., Inc. v. State Tax Comm 'n,Sll P.2d 664,
670 (Utah 1991); Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah
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1984); Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)). Consequently, it
should be assumed the legislature advisedly used each term when it provided that the
prelitigation review is "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation."
The plain language of the Act demonstrates that before a medical malpractice action
can be commenced, certain statutory prerequisites must be satisfied. The specific
language of Section 78-14-12 demonstrates a legislative mandate that the commencing of a
medical action requires more than the usual rule for commencing an action. Because the
requirements are "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation," it is not
enough to commence a medical malpractice action to simply file a complaint or serve a
summons as specified in Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Disregarding the
plain language would render the words used in the Act superfluous or inoperative. The
inclusion of this language in the statute indicates the legislature's intention to define how
and when a medical malpractice action must be commenced. The use of the language
"compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation" demonstrates the intent
that the prelitigation panel review process set forth in Section 78-14-12 is an operative fact
in the commencement of an action and determinative of when an action can be
commenced.
It is also well established that "[t]he form of the verb used in a
statute, i.e., something 'may,' 'shall' or 'must' be done, is the
single most important textual consideration determining
whether a statute is mandatory or directory."
"According to its ordinary construction, the term 'may' means
permissive, and it should receive that interpretation unless such
a construction would be obviously repugnant to the intention of
the Legislature or would lead to some other inconvenience or
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absurdity." The term "shall," on the other hand, "is usually
presumed mandatory and has been interpreted as such
previously in this and other jurisdictions."
State ex rel M.C., 940 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted). "The
meaning of the word shall is ordinarily that of command." Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525
P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1974). The Act further specifies that "The party initiating a medical
liability action shall file a request for prelitigation panel review." Utah Code Ann. § 7814-12(2)(a) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). Thus, the prelitigation panel review is
mandatory. "This mandatory language leaves no discretion to the court." Lyon v. Burton,
2000 UT 19, \ 76, 5 P.3d 616. No malpractice action can be commenced until the
compulsory conditions precedent specified by the Act are satisfied.
McBride-Williams' Initial Complaint was dismissed because they failed to meet the
requirements to commence a malpractice action. Section 78-14-12(l)(c) clearly states
that the prelitigation panel review proceedings are "compulsory as a condition precedent to
commencing litigation." To satisfy the compulsory conditions precedent, generally a
prelitigation panel review takes place and the Division issues an opinion by the prelitigation
panel. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(a) (Supp. 2002). It is undisputed that no such
review occurred in this matter prior to the filing of the Initial Complaint. The Act further
reinforces that before litigation may be commenced, the claimant must have "complied
with all conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation regarding the claim."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(c)(ii) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). In fact, so clear is
the legislative intent that the prelitigation review process is compulsory as a condition
precedent to commencing litigation, the Act sets forth two alternative means to satisfying
18

"all conditions precedent required under this section prior to the commencement of
litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(b)(ii) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added.) In this
case, neither alternative was satisfied at the time McBride-Williams filed their Initial
Complaint. Again, the plain statutory language reinforces the legislative intent that a
petitioner must have complied with all conditions precedent in order to even commence
any litigation regarding the claim.
One alternative to completing a prelitigation panel review is that "the claimant and
any respondent may agree by written stipulation" to waive the prelitigation requirements.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(c)(i) (Supp. 2002). If such a "stipulation is filed with the
division, the division shall within ten days after receipt enter an order divesting itself of
jurisdiction over the claim, as it concerns the stipulating respondent, and stating that the
claimant has complied with all conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation
regarding the claim." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(c)(ii) (Supp. 2002). No such
stipulation or order exists in this case.
The second alternative to prelitigation is set forth in Section 78-14-12(3)(b). That
section of the Act provides:
(b)(i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under
this section within 180 days after the filing of the request for
prelitigation panel review, or within any longer period as
agreed upon in writing by all parties to the review.
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within
the time limits established in Subsection (3)(b)(i), the division
has no further jurisdiction over the matter subject to review
and the claimant is considered to have complied with all
conditions precedent required under this section prior to the
commencement of litigation.
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(b) (Supp. 2002). Once again, the legislature used the plain
language that all conditions precedent required under this section must be complied with
prior to the commencement of litigation.
Indeed, an examination of the plain language of the Act of the statutory scheme
construed as a whole demonstrates that by failing to comply with statutory conditions
precedent to commence their medical malpractice action, McBride-Williams failed to
commence their action within due time and failed to toll the applicable statute of
limitations by simply filing their Initial Complaint on September 15, 2000.
POINT II.
THE SAVINGS STATUTE IS INAPPLICABLE BECAUSE MCBFtfDE-WILLIAMS'
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH STATUTORY CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
PREVENTED THE COMMENCEMENT OF THEIR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ACTION.
Because McBride-Williams had not satisfied the requirements which are
"compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation," they could not and did not
effectively commence their medical malpractice litigation by filing their Initial Complaint.
In the medical malpractice context, a plaintiff cannot commence a medical malpractice
action by simply filing a complaint in district court when the conditions precedent to
commencing litigation have not been met. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002).
The Utah savings statute provides:
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such
action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and
the time limited either by law or contract for commencing the same
shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action
survives, his representatives, may commence a new action within one
20

year after the reversal or failure.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996) (emphasis added). Thus, in order for the savings statute
to apply, an action must first be commenced within due time. Because McBride-Williams
never commenced their malpractice action by filing their Initial Complaint prior to the
running of the two-year statute of limitations, the savings statute is inapplicable.
The Kansas Supreme Court, interpreting similar statutory language, found clear
legislative intent preventing the commencement of litigation absent the completion of
conditions precedent prior to filing of a complaint. In Gessner v. Phillips County
Commissioners, 11 P.3d 1131 (Kan. 2000), the plaintiffs filed suit against the county for
injuries sustained in an automobile accident involving an ambulance which belonged to the
county. As in the case at hand, in Gessner the initial "actions were dismissed by the trial
court for lack of jurisdiction" because of the failure to comply with statutory conditions
precedent "prior to filing the suits." Id. at 1132.
Similar to McBride-Williams' belated filing of the notice of intent to commence
litigation and request for prelitigation required by the Act, in Gessner after dismissal of the
initial actions, the plaintiffs mailed notices to the county in a belated effort to comply with
the statutory conditions precedent and filed new actions. The plaintiffs then "contended]
their actions [we]re timely because the savings statute provisions . . . operate to extend the
time in which the requisite notice [condition precedent] is required to be given." Id. The
arguments, which the court rejected, were similar to those made by McBride-Williams in
the present action:
The principle [sic] argument in support of appellants'
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contention that the savings statute should apply in this case is
that their first suits were not dismissed on the merits and,
therefore, the savings statute applies and brings life into their
later filed actions.
Id. at 1132-33. In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument, the court noted that "the question
pivotal is whether the first actions were commenced in due time" and that the savings
statute, which has language very similar to Utah's savings statute, "by its own terms cannot
operate to save or revive a dismissed cause of action unless the original dismissed action
was first 'commenced within due time.5" Id. at 1133.
The Gessner court, examining the relevant statutory provisions including the
specific language "before commencing such action" and "no action shall be commenced
until," held that such language "expresses a clear legislative intent to disallow the
commencement of any actions prior to the filing of the requisite notice." Id. at 1133-34
(emphasis added). The court further referred to the statutory prerequisite as "a
jurisdictional prerequisite to commencing a lawsuit" and as a "condition precedent to the
filing of an action." Id. at 1134. Consequently, the court held:
It is clear that the legislature intended that failure to provide
the appropriate notice must be construed to preclude
claimants from commencing a legal action. The failure to
file a claim against a municipality, pursuant to [the
statutory condition precedent], is not cured by the
application of the savings statute . . . .
We can reach no other conclusion but that the plaintiffs'
actions were not commenced until well beyond the applicable 2
year period of limitations and the trial court correctly entered
orders of dismissal of all three cases.
Id. (emphasis added). As was the case in Gessner, McBride-Williams' failure to timely
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comply with statutory conditions precedent prevented the commencing of litigation and
renders the savings statute inapplicable.3
In addition, McBride-Williams' disregard for the statutory requirements of the Act
was knowing. Despite McBride-Williams having "been warned about the need to follow
required pre-litigation procedures/' (R. 152), McBride-Williams ignored such warnings
and disregarded the requirements of the Act by filing their Initial Complaint on September
15, 2000 prior to satisfying the Act's requirements which are "compulsory as a condition
precedent to commencing litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002).
McBride-Williams' knowing failure to satisfy the conditions is not cured by the application
of the savings statute. Excusing McBride-Williams' disregard of the statutory provisions
would defeat the very essence of the object sought to be accomplished by the legislature:
that certain conditions are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation
and that those conditions are to be completed within the applicable statute of limitations
period. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c); -12(3)(b)(ii), -12(3)(c)(ii) (Supp. 2002).

3

Prior to the 1985 amendments to the Act, the application of the savings statute was
permitted when a medical malpractice claimant's action was dismissed for filing the
complaint prior to serving the notice of intent to commence litigation set forth in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-8. See e.g. Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979); McGuire v.
University of Utah Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979); Yates v. Vernal Family
Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980). However, the 1985 legislation makes it clear
that the prelitigation panel review process added in § 78-14-12 are operative in the
commencement of a medical malpractice action and determine when a medical malpractice
action can be commenced. The addition of legislatively mandated compulsory conditions
precedent to commencing litigation of a medical malpractice set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§78-14-12 has superceded prior cases which allowed application of the savings statute on
the basis that failing to provide a notice of intent as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8
was not operative in the commencing of an action.
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McBride-Williams should not be allowed to knowingly disregard the requirements and time
frame established by the Act through the application of the savings statute.
POINT III.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NOT TOLLED AND RAN PRIOR TO
MCBRIDE-WILLIAMS FILING THEIR SECOND COMPLAINT.
The statutory scheme set forth in the Act focuses on what is the proper statute of
limitations period. It is uncontested that the applicable statute of limitaLtions governing
McBride-Williams' medical malpractice claims is set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4
(1996). The legislature crafted the Act to include provisions ensuring that the statute of
limitations is tolled during the prelitigation process, which is compulsory as a condition
precedent to commencing litigation. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002). The clear
intent is that prior to commencing litigation of a medical malpractice claim, the
prelitigation process must be properly initiated and the statute of limitations thereby tolled
before the running of the original statute of limitations. The express statutory language
specifying that certain statutory procedures are "compulsory as a condition precedent to
commencing litigation" indicates clear legislative intent to bar medical malpractice actions
unless those conditions precedent are satisfied prior to the running of the statute of
limitations. Since the addition of Section 78-14-12 to the Act in 1985, a plaintiff cannot
toll or extend the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action by simply filing a
complaint in district court when the conditions precedent to commencing litigation have
not been met.
To toll the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action a plaintiff must
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file a notice of intent pursuant to Section 78-14-8 and properly initiate the prelitigation
panel review pursuant to Section 78-14-12. Because McBride-Williams did not comply
with the statutory prerequisites, "the running of the statute of limitations was not tolled."
Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 136 (Utah 1992).
In Kittredge v. Shaddy, 2001 UT, 20 P.3d 285, the plaintiffs medical malpractice
action was dismissed because the statute of limitations had run despite plaintiffs attempts
to comply with the conditions precedent of the Act. This Court noted that the Act requires
compliance with certain conditions in order to extend and toll the running of the statute of
limitations. The Court held that "Because the request [required by Section 78-14-12] was
not timely filed, the statute of limitations was not tolled beyond the 120 day extension."
Id. at If 7. Just as the statute of limitations ran in Kittredge because of the plaintiffs' failure
to comply with the statutory requirements, the statute of limitations ran against
McBride-Williams by October 20, 2000 because they had not satisfied the statutory
conditions to extend or toll the statute of limitations beyond that date. A plaintiffs belated
filing of a notice of intent and request for prelitigation "avails plaintiff nothing because the
two-year statute of limitations ran long before." Id. at ^ 6. It is inconsistent with Kittredge
and Malone to assume that the mere filing of a complaint without having satisfied
conditions precedent in a medical malpractice action tolls the statute of limitations,
especially when in those cases the plaintiffs did not blatantly disregard the provisions of the
Act. Indeed, cases clearly support the conclusion that a medical malpractice claimant has
the burden of properly commencing litigation within the statute of limitations.
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VIII.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IHC Health Services, Inc. dba Dixie Regional
Medical Center respectfully requests that the Court reverse the ruling of the trial court and
find that the statute of limitations has run barring McBride-Williams' claims against IHC
Health Services, Inc. dba Dixie Regional Medical Center.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/3 . day of January 2003.
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Regional Medical Center
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JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Art. VIE, § 5

Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts —
Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.

78-2-2.

Supreme Court jurisdiction.

(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state
law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to
final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
Ivi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from an}7 court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felon}';
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a
first degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees
ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate juris diction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters mvolving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

78-12-40. Effect of failure of action not on merits.
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or
contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies
and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a new
action within one year after the reversal or failure.

78-14-1. Short title of act.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act."

78-14-3.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(I) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice audiology under
Title 58, Chapter 41. Speech-language Pathology7 and Audiology Licensing
Act.
(2) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a
certified social worker under Section 58-60-305.
(3.) "Chiropractic physician" means a person licensed to practice chiropractic under Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiropractic Physician Practice Act.
(4) "Clinical social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a
clinical social worker under Section 58-60-305.
(5) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insurance as provided
in Section 31A-2-102.
(6) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed to practice dental
hygiene as defined in Section 58-69-102.
(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to practice dentistry as defined in
Section 58-69-102.
(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing created in Section 58-1-103.
(9) "Future damages" includes damages for future medical treatment,
care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future
pain and suffering of the judgment creditor.
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished,
or which should have been performed or furnished, b}T any health care
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care,
treatment, or confinement.
(II) "Health care facilhy" means general acute hospitals, specialty
hospitals, home health agencies, hospices, nursing care facilities, assisted
living facilities, birthing centers, ambulatory surgical facilities, small
health care facilities, health care facilities owned or operated by health
maintenance organizations, and end stage renal disease facilities.
(12) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, association, corporation, or other facility or institution who causes to be rendered
or who renders health care or professional services as a hospital, health
care facility, physician, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nursemidwife, dentist, dental 'hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, podiatric physician, psychologist,
chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician,
osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, speech-language pathologist, clinical social worker, certified social worker, social sendee worker,
marriage and family counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others rendering similar care and services relating to or arising out of the health
needs of persons or groups of persons and officers, employees, or agents of
any of the above acting in. the course and scope of their employment.
(13) "Hospital" means a public or private institution licensed under
Title 26, Chapter 21, Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act.
(14) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person licensed to practice as a
licensed practical nurse as provided in Section 58-31b-301.
(15) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of
warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal
injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should
have been rendered by the health care provider.
(16) "Marriage and family therapist" means a person licensed to practice as a marriage therapist or family therapist under Section 58-60-405
and Section 58-60-305.
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(17) "Naturopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice
naturopathy as defined in Section 58-71-102.
(18) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed to engage in practice as
a nurse midwife under Section 58-44a-301.
(19) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to practice optometry under
Title 58, Chapter 16a, Utah Optometry Practice Act.
(20) "Osteopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice osteopathy under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act.
(21) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care
provider, under a contract, express or implied.
(22) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practice pharmacy as
provided in Section 58-17a-301.
(23) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to practice physical
therapy under Title 58, Chapter 24a, Physical Therapist Practice Act.
(24) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice medicine and
surgery under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act.
(25) "Podiatric physician" means a person licensed to practice podiatry
under Title 58, Chapter 5a, Podiatric Physician Licensing Act.
(26) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice as a
physician in this state under Title 58, Chapter 67, U t a h Medical Practice
Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act.
(27) "Psychologist" means a person licensed under Title 58, Chapter 61,
Psychologist Licensing Act, to practice psychology as defined in Section
58-61-102.
(28) "Registered nurse" means a person licensed to practice professional
nursing as provided in Section 58-31b-301.
(29) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee,
attorney-in-fact, or other legal agent of the patient.
(30) "Social service worker" means a person licensed to practice as a
social service worker under Section 58-60-205.
(31) "Speech-language pathologist" means a person licensed to practice
speech-language pathology under Title 58, Chapter 41, Speech-language
Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act.
(32) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or
unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury or damage to another.

78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Application.
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers,
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury,
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged
act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that:
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is
that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff
or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the
patient's body, whichever first occurs; and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of
minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision
of the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice
actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries
which occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that
any action which under former law could have been commenced after the
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion
of time allowed under former law; but any action which under former law could
have been commenced more than four years after the effective date of this act
may be commenced only within four years after the effective date of this act.

78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action.
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated unless
and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or
successor, at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence an action.
Such notice shall include a general statement of the nature of the claim, the
persons involved, the date, time and place of the occurrence, the circumstances
thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of the prospective
defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages sustained.
Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his
attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the
manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the
summons and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt
requested, in which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the
date of mailing. Such notice shall be served within the time allowed for
commencing a malpractice action against a health care provider. If the notice
is served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time
period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health care
provider shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service of notice.
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be
construed as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action,
and shall apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This
section shall not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims
against a health care provider.

78-14-12. Division to provide panel — Exemption — Procedures — Statute of limitations tolled — Composition of panel — Expenses — Division authorized to set license fees.
(1) (a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in alleged medical liability
cases against health care providers as defined in Section 78-14-3, except
dentists.
(b) (i) The division shall establish procedures for prelitigation consideration of medical liability claims for damages arising out of the
provision of or alleged failure-to-provide health care,
(ii) The division may establish rules necessary to administer the
process and procedures related to prelitigation hearings and the
conduct of prelitigation hearings in accordance with Sections 78-14-12
through 78-14-16.
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and are not subject to
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, but are compulsory
as a condition precedent to commencing litigation.
(d) Proceedings conducted under authority of this section are confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process.
(2) (a) The party initiating a medical Hability action shall file a request for
prelitigation panel review with the division within 60 days after the
sendee of a statutory notice of intent to commence action under Section
78-14-8.
(b) The request shall include a cop}^ of the notice of intent to commence
action. The request shall be mailed to all health care providers named in
the notice and request.
(3) (a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this
section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of 60
days following the division's issuance of an opinion by the prelitigation
panel, or 60 days following the termination of jurisdiction by the division
as provided in this subsection. The division shall send any opinion issued
by the panel to all parties by regular mail.
(b) (i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under this
section within 180 days after the filing of the request for prelitigation
panel review, or within any longer period as agreed upon in writing by
all parties to the review.
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within the
time limits established in Subsection (3)(b)(i), the division has no
further jurisdiction over the matter subject to review and the claimant
is considered to have complied with all conditions precedent required
under this section prior to the commencement of litigation.
(c) (i) The claimant and any respondent may agree by written stipulation that no useful purpose would be served by convening a
prelitigation panel under this section.
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(ii) When the stipulation is filed with the division, the division shall
within ten days after receipt enter an order divesting itself of
jurisdiction over the claim, as it concerns the stipulating respondent,
and stating that the claimant has complied with all conditions
precedent to the commencement of litigation regarding the claim.
(4) The division shall provide for and appoint an appropriate panel or panels
to hear complaints of medical liability and damages, made by or on behalf of
any patient who is an alleged victim of medical hability. The panels are
composed of:
(a) one member who is a resident lawyer currently licensed and in good
standing to practice law in this state and who shall serve as chairman of
the panel, who is appointed by the division from among qualified individuals who have registered with the division indicating a willingness to serve
as panel members, and a willingness to comply with the ru].es of professional conduct governing lawyers in the state of Utah? and who has
completed division training regarding conduct of panel hearings;
(b) (i) one member who is a licensed health care provider listed under
Section 78-14-3, who is practicing and knowledgeable in the same
specialty as the proposed defendant, and who is appointed by the
division in accordance with Subsection (5); or
(ii) in claims against only hospitals or their employees, one member
who is an individual currently serving in a hospital administration
position directly related to hospital operations or conduct that includes responsibility for the area of practice that is the subject of the
liability claim, and who is appointed by the division; and
(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital employee, or other
health care provider, and who is a responsible citizen of the state, selected
and appointed by the division from among individuals who have completed
division training with respect to panel hearings.
(5) (a) Each person listed as a health care provider in Section 78-14-3 and
practicing under a license issued by the state, is obligated as a condition
of holding that license to participate as a member of a medical liability
prelitigation panel at reasonable times, places, and intervals, upon issuance, with advance notice given in a reasonable time frame, by the division
of an Order to Participate as a Medical Liability Prelitigation Panel
Member.
(b) A licensee may be excused from appearance and participation as a
panel member upon the division finding participation by the licensee will
create an unreasonable burden or hardship upon the licensee.
(c) A licensee whom the division finds failed to appear and participate
as a panel member when so ordered, without adequate explanation or
justification and without being excused for cause by the division, may be
assessed an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000.
(d) A licensee whom the division finds intentionally or repeatedly failed
to appear and participate as a panel member when so ordered, without
adequate explanation or justification and without being excused for cause
by the division, may be assessed an administrative fine not to exceed
$5,000, and is guilty of unprofessional conduct.
(e) All fines collected under Subsections (5)(c) and (d) shall be deposited
in the Physicians Education Fund created in Section 58-67a-l.
(6) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, under oath, that he
has no bias or conflict of interest with respect to any matter under consideration.
(7) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per diem
compensation and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established
by rules of the division.
(8) (a) In addition to the actual cost of administering the licensure of health
care providers, the division may set license fees of health care providers
within the limits established by law equal to their proportionate costs of
administering prelitigation panels.
(b) The claimant bears none of the costs of administering the
prelitigation panel except under Section 78-14-16.

IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TERESA MCBRIDE-WILLIAMS, et al.J
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vs.
G. STEDMAN HUARD, et al.,

)
)
)
)
;

RULING ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 020500090
Judge G. Rand Beacham

Defendants. '

This matter came before the Court for hearing on June 20, 2002 pursuant to the
Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant IHC Health Services, Inc. dba Dixie Regional
Medical Center. The motion was joined by Defendant G. Stedman Huard and was opposed
by Plaintiffs. The Court granted permission to file additional authorities after the hearing,
and the last were filed July 23, 2002. Having read the memoranda and authorities, having
heard the arguments of counsel, and having reviewed the file, the Court rules as follows:
FACTS
There are no genuine issues as to the following essential facts: Plaintiffs seek damages
related to the death of their father, which occurred October 15,1998 at IHC's hospital in St.
George, Utah. Plaintiffs first filed a pro se Complaint on September 15, 2000, which was
dismissed by this Court on May 29, 2001 for Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § § 78-14-1

et seq. See McBride-Williams. et al. v. Huard, et aL Civil No. 000501491, Fifth District
Court for Washington County, State of Utah. On May 9,2001 Just prior to the dismissal of
the first action, Plaintiffs served a Notice of Intent and Request for Prelitigation Review with
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. On December 12, 2001, a
Certificate of Compliance was issued by the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing. Plaintiffs then filed the Complaint in this action on January 11, 2002.1
ANALYSIS
Defendants rely on Utah. Code Ann. § 78-14-12, which provides that the proceedings
for pre-litigation reviews of malpractice actions against health care providers "are
compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation/5 Defendants also rely on
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4, which provides that "[n]o malpractice action against a health care
provider may be brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient
discovers . . . the injury. . ." On this basis, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' Complaint in
this action, which was filed more than two years after the death of Plaintiffs' father, was
commenced more than one year too late.
Plaintiffs rely on Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40, which provides that "[i]f any action is
l

lt has been the experience of this Court and others at the trial court level that the facts on which we rely
are occasionally changed at the appellate court level, even to include facts which were not presented to the trial
court at all. This appears to result occasionally from appeUate attorneys failing to give the appellate courts a
complete record of the facts as they were presented to the trial court. On a motion for summary judgment, this
Court feels constrained to consider only those facts which are presented in compliance with Rule 4-501 of the Utah
Rules of Judicial Administration, and it is this Court's opinion that an appellate review which extends beyond
those facts, as identified by the trial court, is erroneous. Consequently, this Court emphasizes that this Ruling is
based on the set of facts specified above.
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commenced within due time and . . . if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited . . . by law . . . for commencing
the same shall have expired, the plaintiff. . . may commence a new action within one year
after the... failure." On this basis, Plaintiffs argue that the dismissal of their first Complaint
was "otherwise than upon the merits," and that their Complaint in this action was filed within
one year after the dismissal of the first Complaint and after complying with the pre-litigation
requirements, so that their causes of action are saved by section 78-12-40 and are not barred
by the statute of limitations of section 78-14-4.
Neither party has cited controlling authority on this issue, because apparently none
exists in Utah. Defendants cite one persuasive decision from a sister state, but this Court is
mostpersuaded by Plaintiffs' argument from Standard Federal Savings and Loan Association
v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991). In that decision, the court held that the statute
requiring an action for a deficiency judgment to be filed within three months after a trust
deed foreclosure sale didnotrule out application of the "savings" provision of section 78-1240. The court's reasoning focused on legislative intent:
In the absence of such a plain expression of intent [to forever bar an action
from being refilled after a dismissal for a procedural defect], we have generally
read statutes that impose preconditions to filing suit as establishing only
procedural hurdles to suit, hurdles that can be cleared, rather than absolute
bars to suit. . . . The relevant inquiry is whether the legislature made plain an
intention to bar forever claims of those who are guilty of a procedural misstep.
821 P.2d at

3

This Court agrees with Plaintiffs that section 78-14-12 does not plainly state an
intention to bar forever malpractice claims against health care providers which have been
dismissed for failure to comply with pre-litigation requirements, even when read in
connection with section 78-14-4. This Court is persuaded that the "savings" provisions of
section 78-12-40 are applicable to Plaintiffs' action against Defendants.2
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. This Ruling is
not a final order for appeal, of course. The Court suggests, however, that Defendants
consider filing a petition for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order.
Dated this

day of August, 2002.

G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE

2

This Court is fully aware of the now-frequent instruction of the appellate courts for the trial courts to
make a more extensive analysis m rulings such as this See, e g, Gabriel v Salt Lake City Corp., 2001 UT App
277, 431 Utah Adv Rep 7 That instruction is not always realistic, however First, the caseloads of the trial
courts continue to increase while many courts' time and resources remain stagnant, for example, the judicial
resources m this district have remained the same for over 13 years m spite of the overwhelming growth in the
population and case filings m the district Second, appellate reviews of summary judgment decisions of the Utah
district courts resulted m a reversal rate well over 50% m reported cases decided in the Utah appellate courts m the
year 2000 In light of the huge caseloads earned by the tnal courts, the time required for drafting detailed ruling
(winch is more likely to be reversed than to be affirmed) is often too great a luxury for a tnal judge to afford
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Stephen W. Owens
Attorneys for Dr. Huard
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